Property restitution is not a simple problem of the rule of law which can be solved to everybody's satisfaction by passing some legislation or other, nor is it a problem of economic policy alone which can be decided upon to the disregard of individual and group rights and their history. The policy choices present the policymaker with difficult trade-offs (Holmes 1993) . The difficulties in the Balkans were no different from those encountered in Central Europe and the Baltic, but the need to stabilize this post-conflict, hard-pressed region lent them a greater urgency. The stakes were higher in South-Eastern Europe, making policy choices more difficult.
The first general choice can be phrased as justice versus economic efficiency. Post-conflict and post-totalitarian settings are ripe with injustice. Whole groups, as well as many individuals were unjustly deprived by their rights, including their property. The retributive justice perspective argues that such injustice needs to be addressed in order for the new democratic regime to develop on a sound basis (Elster 2006) . A new system of formal legal rules cannot be enacted on the foundation of past injustices or harms, and so specific legal forms of political and moral condemnation of the past need to be established. The new regime cannot avoid 'dealing with the past in order to make the future happen' (Teitel 2000) . However, a successful transition to market economy and integration into EU needs stable basic economic institutions: we know that no development is possible unless property disputes are solved, reducing transaction costs (North 1992)/ Privatization, a cornerstone of transition economic policy, cannot proceed if certainty is not achieved on the status of state property (Stark and Bruszt 1998) . Even from an EU integration perspective, any property in a new member country must have a clear status if it is to be acquired by an EU citizen or involved in an EU funded project. While those two objectives, restitution of justice and search for economic efficiency, should ideally go together, as the greatest stability is likely to be achieved by the implementation of a just solution, they often conflict in practice because transitional justice has high transaction costs, as a result of competing claims, poor property archives, corrupt administrations and unprofessional judiciaries (Swinnen 1999; Sadurski and all 2005) . Although the cost varies according to the choices governments make, property restitution is always costly. Furthermore, as regards industrial assets or agricultural land, restitution sometimes results in a fragmented and unmanageable ownership structure, therefore contrasting the goals of justice and economic efficiency.
The second general choice can be phrased as thin versus thick rule of law. The attempt to solve restitution claims, particularly through compensation, risks falling short of a substantial fulfilment of the rule of law (Kuti 2009 ). The bulk of the restitution in East Central Europe could not but favour the members of the national majorities' groups dispossessed by Communism versus other groups in the meantime absent, for instance the deported Germans and Jews (Offe 1993; Avineri 1993) . In another example, the result that restitution policies achieved was objective inequality, as everyone was entitled to reparation within the same limitations, while having suffered losses of different extent (Kuti 2009 (Solomon 1995: XV) The attempt to restore property in kind led to competing valid claims, as some states had sold on the expropriated property to new owners, who could then present equally valid ownership titles. There are many such cases: for instance, in post-Dayton Bosnia returning refugees were accommodated in property previously expropriated during Communist times and which had already been claimed back by its owners. Many attempts to treat restitution in a retributive way (by rehabilitating older claims), particularly with restitution in kind without putting conditions to the owner, raised fresh questions of social justice. If a building expropriated in 1950 still exists but is occupied by many tenants, can it be restored with no restrictions attached to the former owner or the former owner´s heirs? For instance, can absentee, perhaps emigrant, landlords be reinstated on their land even if that means evicting families with no title but who have had the use of the land for decades, as in the case of many Roma communities? Many governments needed to find an alternative to absolute justice to solve such conflicting interests and attain some social peace and relative justice, in Hans Kelsen's words (Kelsen, 1971: 21-2) . Restorative justice solutions look for legitimacy by accommodating the objectives of efficiency, wealth-maximization, and public choice regulation (Braithwaite 2001; Eisnaugle 2003; Priban 2009 ). But such trust-building, reconciliation solutions between those who lose from a regime policy and those who win are by no means cheap, as they usually entail compensations from the state to both sides of the conflict.
Finally, there is a fourth dilemma, that of implementation, which can be only partly subsumed in the trade-off between efficiency and justice. Is it worth engaging in such a demanding administrative process, knowing the low capacity and weak integrity of post communist administration, or would such an endeavour merely create resources for corruption? Can the postCommunist public administrative apparatus be trusted to accomplish in a reasonably fair and effective way the daunting task of identifying lawful owners, assessing properties and compensating the right people for their lost properties? What procedures and institutions must be created, at the central and local level, to ensure that property restitution proceeds accurately and expeditiously and avoids conflicts of interest? Should the reconstitution of property be made as accurate as possible, or should one rather promote a uniform treatment to simplify the administrative task and reduce the potential for discretion?
There are no simple answers to such policy questions. Furthermore, as we shall show, a rational cost-benefit analysis could not in many instances have ensured the best solution. Even if many governments attempted to create a collective solution to the problem with a unitary policy approach, many individuals or groups sought justice by individual law suits in domestic and international Courts.
Thus was created the remarkably complicated landscape that domestic governments and the EU are presently faced with in the Balkans.
Why return property at all? To sum up the complex motivation behind restitution policies (Holmes 1993; Pogany 1997), we can divide factors behind such exploits into bottom-up and topdown driven. Bottom-up factors were primarily the claims of former owners and their descendants, the individual decisions of petitioned Courts which decided to rule in such cases on the basis of the civil code and not special legislation, but also the entrepreneurship of people having the current use of expropriated property who demanded the legalization of their status, once private property was reinstituted as a norm. The more property had been expropriated under Communism, the more grassroots demand existed after 1989 and the option of not returning it became impossible: Nozick's entitlement theory (Nozick 1974) summarized the widespread belief in countries where public opinion was dominantly anticommunist. As Communism was mostly perceived as a form of foreign occupation, as the famous essay of Milan Kundera (1977) proclaimed, the fairest distribution was considered to be what had existed before Communism had violated the natural and legal order of things: the legitimate public policy was therefore the one seeking a restoration to that particular state of affairs. Finally, top-down actions originated from either political parties, with anticommunists all favouring some form of restitution policy, and from international actors involved in conflict resolution, particularly in the former Yugoslavia.
II. Transformation
The choice of restitution policy in Eastern Europe depended partly on the extent and depth of expropriation, which varied from state to state. Three distinct communist systems operated in the region, with differing implications for post communist reform: essentially Stalinist totalitarian regimes in Romania and Albania; an orthodox communist regime in Soviet-bloc Bulgaria; and a reformed communist system in Yugoslavia which had incorporated some liberal elements and shared a number The restitution histories in Romania, Albania and Bulgaria speak strongly of the 'unity imposed by history' of the Balkan countries (Pavlowitch 1999) . Before the advent of Communism they had been overwhelmingly rural countries, with up to 80% of the population made up of peasants. Owning land had been a secular aspiration of the peasants in the Balkans, which began to materialize only with the land reforms after the First World War, so the confiscation or collectivization by the Communists of peasants' small plots was highly unpopular (Mitranyi 1951) . As the post communist transitions in these countries, unlike in central Europe, were initially controlled by Communist factions, the first restitution acts were passed by Communists in an attempt to limit the process. They were typically de-collectivization acts, mixing the restoration of small quantities of the land previously shared in collective property to a de facto privatization, granting land also to people who had not owned any before -in fact in Albania only to the latter. Residential properties, which had been confiscated in large numbers in those countries -for instance all buildings urban in centres were to be turned into offices, embassies, and so forth -were in part occupied by tenants who rented them from the state.
Tenants´ status ranged from poor Roma families cramped in small flats to the former Communist nomenklatura, who occupied the most luxurious buildings which had been the property of the interwar elites, a symbolic issue of great political significance. The levels of the rents in such houses remained subsidized years after the market took hold, making tenants from formerly expropriated property a privileged category. By the mid-nineties, what had been a legal conflict between the state and a section of the population, the former owners, had gradually turned into a genuine social conflict between two categories of population. In the countryside, the conflict pitted the new owners resulting from the post communist privatization of lands against the old owners, who would not settle for the restitution of only a portion of their former property (Swinnen 1999) . In towns, the conflict similarly placed former owners who claimed back their flats and houses in opposition to the new tenants occupying them.
The collapse of the former Communist economy added new categories of problems and conflicts, such as in Albania where peasants occupied their former lands in the North and in Tirana squatters built whole new townships on agricultural land now claimed by its former owners. The more a comprehensive resolution of the property restitution problem was delayed, the more such problems became insoluble. Ceausescu's home village, for instance (Scornicesti), a vanguard for all social experiments, had been 'systematized' in the late eighties, so peasants had their traditional houses demolished. They were dispossessed and moved into blocks of flats as tenants. After 1990, when all public housing was privatized to the benefit of its occupants, they became the owners. However, they could not buy the land under the blocks, because it had The stand-offs over land restitution in Romania and Bulgaria had catastrophic consequences for the agricultural sectors in these countries. In both countries, agriculture contracted more and recuperated later than the rest of the economy during transition. Late in the nineties, when the two countries were struggling to acquire 'functional market economy' status from the European Commission, in order to be invited to start negotiations with the EU, there was still no land market worthy of the name 1 . A huge percentage of arable land was becoming wasteland, and the property on it was so fragmented and disputed that few farms met the size criteria making them eligible for EU farming subsidies (Negrescu 1995 operated at their own discretion and to their own profit, generating great dissatisfaction (Gelpern 1993; Verdery 2004 ).
As to urban property, its restitution saga has outlasted the process of EU accession 4 . By September 2000, eight years after the launch of the restitution of immovable property in Bulgaria, more than 100,104 restitution claims had been submitted and fewer than 60% The financial compensation process worked no better than the restitution in kind. In
Bulgaria, a Law on the Compensation of Owners of Nationalised Assets 7 was passed in
November 1997, but the process of issuing compensation bonds lacked transparency, so it was permanently plagued by scandals (Stefan and all 2010) . In less than three years after the adoption of a law on compensation, some 46,878 requests for compensation for property that could not be given back were filed, of which more than half were met 8 . 200,000 property claims were processed, with 99% of the property being returned to its owners. In many instances, the state housing provided to returnees had unclear property status and was claimed by its former owners. As the 'package of property laws' provided the right for returnees to buy the accommodation allocated to them, properties were practically privatized to The importance of the external factor was, as we have seen, decisive in countries like
Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina In the next section, we shall see that even its less direct role had a considerable effect.
III. Europeanization
Clearly, the origins of the European influence in SEE are to be found in the desire of all those countries to join the EU. While the transition in SEE has lagged behind that of Central Europe, the latter provided the blueprint (Vachudova 2005) . Romania and Bulgaria emulated their former Warsaw
Pact fellows (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland) when applying to join the European institutions: first the Council of Europe (a preliminary step for accession to both NATO and the EU) and then the EU (see Table 1 ). The Western Balkans was a further step behind the Eastern Balkans due to the two Yugoslav wars, but once the stabilization of the region was achieved it followed on. Once the must establish that it has a sufficient basis in national law, for example where there is settled case-law confirming it in the domestic courts or where there is a final court judgment in the claimant's favour 22 .
Therefore, in the absence of domestic laws providing for restitution or compensation for lost property or of domestic courts' final judgments providing for restitution or compensation, none of those who lost their possessions before 1989 can win before the ECtHR, the Court intervening in favour of the rule of law rather than for an absolute right to property (Allen 2007) . The paradox therefore is that only a post-communist country which initiates regulation on the matter after adopting the Convention of Human Rights can become liable under international law. Hungary, which had prior to its accession passed a law on the subject solving the matter by means of a small universal compensation, was therefore insulated from any further claims. The review of the cases before the Court, presented in Table 2 , shows that the Court had found violations of Article 1 for all the countries of the region, and a systemic problem was identified in the case of Romania, Albania and Bosnia. Romania is the undisputed regional leader at both law suits and violations in the area of property, with nearly ten thousand cases admitted and many more found Second, we find 'reform' as well, ideologically driven policy which exist everywhere -for instance, in Romania's and Bulgaria's adoption of flat income taxes. But third, as a result of the social engineering of Communism and its complicated legacy, we still have some persistent form of 'revolution', a struggle between old and new elites which decisively shapes politics and institutional development. Through the complexity of this landscape, the EU accession of the Valkan countries is not business as usual, but rather a complex battlefield where these processes come together or conflict in the formulation of public policy.
